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"When the President does it, that means that it is not illegal." 1 So
Richard Nixon infamously defended his approval of a plan to engage in
warrantless wiretapping of Americans involved in the antiwar movement of
the 1970s. For thirty years Nixon's defense has stood as the apogee of
presidential arrogance.
Nixon was ultimately proved wrong. The
wiretapping plan was shelved when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, of all
people, objected to it. Nixon's approval of the program was listed in the
articles of impeachment, and he was forced to resign. Nixon learned the hard
way that presidents are not above the law.
President George W. Bush appears not to have learned that lesson.
His defense of the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretapping of
Americans resurrects the Nixon doctrine with one modification. For Bush,
∗
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I am pro bono co-counsel in Center for
Constitutional Rights v. Bush, which challenges the legality of the NSA spying program. Before my
involvement in that lawsuit, I also co-authored two letters to Congressional leaders on behalf of fourteen
constitutional law professors and former government officials addressing the Justice Department’s
defense of the legality of the National Security Agency (NSA) spying program. These letters are
published
in
David
Cole
and
Martin
S.
Lederman,
TIT
LE, 81 Ind. L.J. 1355 (2006). After the Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006), we wrote a third letter addressing that decision’s implications for the NSA. See Letter to
Congressional leaders from Curtis A. Bradley, et al., July 14, 2006, available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/media/pdfs/FISA07190608.pdf (last visited November 20, 2006). This essay
is adapted in part from those letters, and thus I owe a debt of gratitude to all of the cosigners for their
suggestions and contributions along the way: Curtis Bradley, Walter Dellinger, Ronald Dworkin, Richard
A. Epstein, Harold Hongju Koh, Philip B. Heymann, Martin S. Lederman, Beth Nolan, William S.
Sessions, Geoffrey R. Stone, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Laurence H. Tribe, and William W. Van Alstyne. I
owe particular thanks to Martin Lederman, who shared the laboring oar with me in drafting the letters.
1
Interview by David Frost with Richard Nixon, former President, United States (May 19, 1977).
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when the Commander-in-Chief does it, it is not illegal. In a memorandum to
Congress, the Bush Administration argued that the Commander-in-Chief
may not be restricted in his choice of the "means and methods of engaging
the enemy," and that President Bush is therefore free to wiretap Americans
without court approval in the "war on terror" even though Congress has
made it a crime to do so. 2 This is not the first time President Bush has
asserted uncheckable executive power in the "war on terror." He has claimed
similar powers with respect to torture; cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment; and detention of so-called "enemy combatants." These claims to
unchecked power have triggered strong negative reactions from
conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats, and Supreme Court
Justices and members of Congress. Yet these rebukes seem not to affect the
president, who continues to assert the authority.
The administration’s stance with respect to National Security
Agency (NSA) spying is emblematic of its approach to the war on terror. At
virtually every juncture, it has taken overly aggressive positions that
unnecessarily run roughshod over fundamental principles of the rule of law.
By doing so, the president has sparked negative feedback at home and
abroad. This pattern of overreaching is unnecessary to keep us secure and is
in fact likely to make us less safe, as it divides our nation and plays into the
terrorists’ hands by fueling anti-American sentiment abroad.
This essay will argue that the administration’s defense of the NSA
spying program is fundamentally flawed, both as a matter of law and as a
matter of national security policy. The administration makes three legal
arguments in defense of the policy, contending that: (1) Congress authorized
the program without saying so when it authorized the use of military force
against al Qaeda; (2) the Commander-in-Chief has inherent and uncheckable
authority under Article II of the Constitution to conduct such warrantless
wiretapping, notwithstanding a criminal prohibition; and (3) the program is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 3 Each argument fails. The
argument that Congress authorized the program defies basic principles of
statutory construction. The claim that the Commander-in-Chief has
2
U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President (2006) [hereinafter DOJ Memo].
3
See Letter from William Moschella, Assistant Att’y Gen., to select members of the House and
Senate
Intelligence
Committees,
(Dec.
22,
2005),
available
at
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsa122205ltr.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2006)
[hereinafter Moschella Letter] (summarizing the legal authorities with which the administration justifies
its NSA spying program); see also DOJ Memo, supra note 2, at 32; Wartime Executive Power and the
National Security Agency’s Surveillance Authority: Hearing Before the S.Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of the United States) [hereinafter Executive and
NSA Wartime Authority Hearing] (stating that there are numerous Congressional checks on the way in
which the President conducts war time activities). These letters are also published at 81 Ind. L.J. 1355.
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uncheckable authority with respect to "the means and methods of engaging
the enemy" is contrary to the text of the Constitution, the structure of checks
and balances, and a long line of Supreme Court precedent. And no Fourth
Amendment precedent supports the notion that the president may wiretap
Americans without probable cause or a warrant.
As a matter of national security policy, the administration defends
the program by claiming that if al Qaeda is calling into the United States, we
should be listening to that call. Few dispute that proposition. But under
existing law, the president did not need to authorize conduct in violation of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 4 to track those calls.
Accordingly, the NSA program presumably must be broader than that.
Second, to the extent the president seeks to engage in more widespread
surveillance than that authorized by FISA, the proper recourse was to ask
Congress to change the law. The administration sent what ultimately became
the USA PATRIOT ACT (Patriot Act) 5 to Congress within days of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Patriot Act made several
revisions to FISA. But the president chose not to ask Congress to change
FISA to authorize this particular program, and instead ordered that the law be
violated in secret. That is not a permissible option in a democracy.
Moreover, had the president pursued the legal avenue for changing the law, it
is likely Congress would have extended him authority to do what was
necessary, and the program would have generated far less attention and
controversy than it has today. The controversy surrounding the program
centers not so much on the surveillance itself, but on the fact that the
president has asserted unchecked authority to violate criminal law in secret.
There would have been far less controversy, and far less public disclosure,
had the president followed the law.
I. The Statutory Argument
The administration’s initial defense of the NSA spying program is
that Congress authorized the program when, on September 14, 2001, it
enacted the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) against the
perpetrators of 9/11 and those who harbor them. 6 This argument fails for
three reasons. First, it is directly contrary to specific language in other
federal statutes establishing that FISA and the criminal code are the
4

Foreign Intelligence Survey Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2000).
USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2000) (codified as amended
in multiple sections of the U.S.C.).
6
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, § 2 (a) (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. III 2003)).
5
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"exclusive means" for conducting electronic surveillance. Second, it would
require repeal by implication of language in those statutes. Third, it conflicts
with the administration’s claim that it chose not to ask Congress to amend
FISA to authorize the program because several members of Congress told
them that it would be "difficult, if not impossible" to obtain.
An assessment of the administration’s statutory argument must begin
with the legal landscape Congress faced when it enacted the AUMF. At that
time, and today, FISA comprehensively regulates electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes within the United States. 7 FISA, enacted in
1978 after revelations of widespread spying on Americans by federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies—including the NSA—struck a careful
balance between protecting civil liberties and preserving the "vitally
important government purpose" of obtaining valuable intelligence to
safeguard national security. 8
With minor exceptions not invoked by the Bush administration and
not relevant here, FISA authorizes "electronic surveillance" for foreign
intelligence purposes only upon certain specified showings, and only if
approved by a court. 9 Foreign intelligence surveillance is permissible upon a
showing of probable cause that the target of the surveillance is an "agent of a
foreign power," which includes a member of a terrorist organization. 10
Congress sought to make clear that electronic surveillance was to be
undertaken only pursuant to federal statute. To that end, Congress expressly
provided that FISA and specified provisions of the federal criminal code
(which govern wiretaps for criminal investigation) are the "exclusive means
by which electronic surveillance … may be conducted." 11 And Congress
made it a crime under two separate provisions of the U.S. Code to undertake
electronic surveillance not authorized by statute. 12
7

FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811.
S. Rep. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 9 (1977).
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1802, 1804, 1805. FISA defines "electronic surveillance" to include any
acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio
communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United states person who is in
the United states, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under
the circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes . . . without the consent of an party thereto if such acquisition
occurs in the United States . . . the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information . . . .50 U.S.C. § 1801(f).
10
Id. at § 1805(a).
11
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (emphasis added); see also Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan and
Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorneys for the American Law Division, to the United States Dept. of
State
(Jan.
5,
2006)
(on
file
at
the
Congressional
Research
Service
at
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/NSA/nsa_research_memo.pdf) (noting Congress's stated
intention to make FISA the sole mechanism for the collection of foreign intelligence information).
12
50 U.S.C. § 1809; 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (making it a crime to conduct wiretapping except as
"specifically provided in this chapter," § 2511(1), or as authorized by FISA, § 2511(2)(e)).
8
9
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Most importantly for purposes of this question, Congress specifically
addressed in FISA itself the question of domestic wiretapping during
wartime. In 18 U.S.C. § 1811, titled "Authorization during time of war,"
FISA dictates that "[n]otwithstanding any other law, the President, through
the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court
order under this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for a
period not to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by
the Congress." 13 Thus, even where Congress has declared war—a more
formal step than an authorization such as the AUMF—the law limits
warrantless wiretapping to the first fifteen days of the conflict. The
legislative history explains that if the President needed further warrantless
surveillance during wartime, Congress would consider and enact further
authorization as appropriate. 14
The Bush administration has conceded that the NSA program falls
within the definition of "electronic surveillance" covered by FISA, 15 and that
the program was not authorized by any of the above provisions. The
surveillance is conducted without court orders, and although the
administration has been inconsistent about this, it appears that the
surveillance may be predicated on a less solid showing than the "probable
cause" required by FISA. 16 The administration maintains, however, that the
program did not violate existing law because Congress implicitly authorized
the NSA program when it enacted the AUMF against al Qaeda.
The administration’s statutory argument fails for three reasons.
First, the argument rests on an unstated general "implication" from the
AUMF that directly contradicts express and specific language in FISA.
Specific and "carefully drawn" statutes prevail over general statutes where
there is a conflict. 17 In FISA, Congress directly and specifically regulated
domestic warrantless wiretapping for foreign intelligence and national
13

50 U.S.C. § 1811.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 34 (1978) (explaining the 15-day during which the attorney
general may authorize electronic surveillance). The report states:
The Conferees intend that this [15-day] period will allow time for consideration of any
amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a wartime emergency . . . . The
conferees expect that such amendment would be reported with recommendations within seven
days and that each House would vote on the amendment within seven days thereafter.
Id.
15
See DOJ Memo, supra note 2, at 3 (arguing that electronic surveillance conducted by the NSA
is consistent with FISA).
16
Michael Hayden, who headed the NSA while the program was established, has stated that the
trigger for surveillance under the program is "softer" than the probable cause required by FISA. Attorney
General Gonzales, however, contradicted that claim and asserted that NSA officials are employing a
probable cause standard. Executive and NSA Wartime Authority Hearing, supra note 3.
17
See Morales v. TWA, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1992) (quoting International Paper Co. v.
Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987)) (explaining that a broad clause should not preempt a more warily
drawn statute).
14

5
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security purposes, including during wartime, and those provisions preclude
the administration’s interpretation of the AUMF.
In light of the specific and comprehensive regulation of FISA,
especially the fifteen-day war provision, there is no basis for finding in the
AUMF’s general language implicit authority for unchecked warrantless
domestic wiretapping. As Justice Frankfurter stated in rejecting a similar
argument by President Truman when he sought to defend the seizure of the
steel mills during the Korean War on the basis of implied congressional
authorization:
It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general
language and to say that Congress would have explicitly
written what is inferred, where Congress has not addressed
itself to a specific situation. It is quite impossible, however,
when Congress did specifically address itself to a problem, as
Congress did to that of seizure, to find secreted in the
interstices of legislation the very grant of power which
Congress consciously withheld. To find authority so
explicitly withheld is . . . to disrespect the whole legislative
process and the constitutional division of authority between
President and Congress. 18

Because Congress specifically provided that even a declaration of
war—a more formal step than an authorization to use military force—would
authorize only fifteen days of warrantless surveillance, one cannot
reasonably conclude that the AUMF provided the President with unlimited
and indefinite warrantless wiretapping authority. In addition, such a notion
ignores any reasonable understanding of legislative intent. An amendment to
FISA of the sort that would presumably be required to authorize the NSA
program here would be a momentous statutory development, undoubtedly
subject to serious legislative debate. It is not the sort of change that
Congress would make inadvertently and without a single word of discussion.
As the Supreme Court recently noted, "Congress … does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes." 19
The administration invokes Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 20 and argues that
because the Supreme Court in that case construed the AUMF to provide
18
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
19
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 921 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
20
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

6
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sufficient statutory authorization for detention of American citizens captured
on the battlefield in Afghanistan, the AUMF may also be read to authorize
the President to conduct "signals intelligence" on the enemy, even if that
includes electronic surveillance targeting U.S. persons within the United
States. 21 However, FISA’s provision addressing wiretapping authority during
wartime plainly distinguishes this situation from Hamdi. Congress has not
specifically enacted a statute authorizing limited detention of American
citizens during wartime, and therefore the Court was free to read the AUMF
to include an authorization to detain U.S. citizens fighting for the enemy.
Had there been a statute on the books providing that when Congress declares
war, the President may detain Americans as "enemy combatants" only for the
first fifteen days of the conflict, the Court could not reasonably have read the
AUMF to authorize silently what Congress had specifically sought to limit.
22

The administration argues that 50 U.S.C. § 1811 is not dispositive
because the AUMF might convey more authority than a declaration of war,
noting that a declaration of war is generally only a single sentence. 23 But in
fact, declarations of war have always been accompanied, in the same
enactment, by an authorization to use military force. 24 It would make no
sense to declare war without authorizing the president to use military force in
the conflict. In light of that reality, Section 1811 necessarily contemplates a
situation in which Congress has both declared war and authorized the use of
military force—and even that double authorization permits only fifteen days
21

Id. at 516–17.
The Department of Justice argues that signals intelligence, like detention, is a "fundamental
incident of waging war," and therefore is authorized by the AUMF. DOJ Memo, supra note 2, at 12–13.
But what is properly considered an implied incident of conducting war is affected by the statutory
landscape that exists at the time the war is authorized. Thus, even if warrantless electronic surveillance of
Americans for foreign intelligence purposes were a traditional incident of war when that subject was
unregulated by Congress—which is far from obvious, at least in cases where the Americans targeted are
not themselves suspected of being foreign agents or in league with terrorists—it can no longer be an
implied incident after the enactment of FISA, which expressly addresses the situation of war, and
precludes such conduct beyond the first fifteen days of the conflict.
23
DOJ Memo, supra note 2, at 26–27.
24
See, e.g., Act of June 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755 (declaring war against the United Kingdom
and authorizing President to use land and naval forces); Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9 (providing
for prosecution of existing war against Mexico and authorizing President to use military force); Act of
Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364 (declaring war against Spain and empowering President to use land
and naval forces); Joint Resolution of Apr. 6, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (declaring war against Germany and
authorizing President to employ naval and military force); Joint Resolution of Dec. 7, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat.
429 (declaring war against Austrio-Hungarian Empire and authorizing President to employ naval and
military force); Joint Resolution of Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795 (declaring war against Japan and
authorizing President to employ naval and military force); Joint Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 564, 55
Stat. 796 (declaring war against Germany and authorizing President to employ naval and military force);
Joint Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 565, 55 Stat. 797 (declaring war against Italy and authorizing
President to employ naval and military force).
22

7
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of warrantless electronic surveillance. Where, as here, Congress has seen fit
only to authorize the use of military force—and not to declare war—the
President cannot assert that he has been granted more authority than when
Congress declares war as well. 25
Second, the administration’s statutory authorization argument would
require the conclusion that Congress implicitly repealed several parts of 18
U.S.C. § 2511. Subsection (2)(f) identifies FISA and specific criminal code
provisions as "the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . may
be conducted." 26 In addition, § 2511 makes it a crime to conduct
wiretapping except as "specifically provided in this chapter," 27 or as
authorized by FISA. 28 The AUMF is neither "in this chapter" nor an
amendment to FISA, and therefore to find that it authorizes electronic
surveillance would require an implicit repeal of all the above provisions of §
2511.
Repeals by implication are strongly disfavored; they can be
established only by "overwhelming evidence" that Congress intended the
repeal. 29 Here, there is no such evidence. "[T]he only permissible
justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes
are irreconcilable." 30 Section 2511 and the AUMF, however, are fully
reconcilable. The former makes clear that specified existing laws are the
"exclusive means" for conducting electronic surveillance, and that
conducting wiretapping outside that specified legal regime is a crime. The
AUMF authorizes only such force as is "necessary and appropriate." There
is no evidence that Congress considered tactics violative of existing express
statutory limitations "appropriate force." Accordingly, there is no basis
whatsoever, let alone the "overwhelming evidence" required, for overcoming
the strong presumption against implied repeals.
The Supreme Court’s June 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, confirms
that the AUMF cannot be construed to authorize warrantless wiretapping. In
Hamdan, the Court held that the president’s military commissions for trying
25
It is noteworthy that one of the amendments the DOJ was contemplating seeking in 2002 in a
draft bill leaked to the press and popularly known as "Patriot II," would have amended 50 U.S.C. § 1811
to extend its fifteen-day authorization for warrantless wiretapping to situations where Congress had not
declared war but only authorized use of military force or when the nation had been attacked. If, as the
DOJ now contends, the AUMF gave the President unlimited authority to conduct warrantless wiretapping
of the enemy, it would be unnecessary to seek such an amendment. See Domestic Security Enhancement
Act of 2003, § 103 (Strengthening Wartime Authorities Under FISA) (draft Justice Dept bill) (seeking to
expand FISA’s wartime exception to apply also after Congress has authorized use of military force).
26
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f).
27
Id. § 2511(1).
28
Id. § 2511(2)(e).
29
See J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 137 (2001) (requiring
overwhelming evidence to establish repeal by implication).
30
Id. at 141–42 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)).
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foreign terror suspects for war crimes, which were established by an
executive military order, violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions incorporated therein.
The
administration had argued in Hamdan that when Congress enacted the
AUMF against Al Qaeda, it implicitly authorized the president to implement
his military commissions, thereby overriding any limits that might have been
found in preexisting statutes such as the UCMJ. The Court summarily
rejected this argument: "[W]hile we assume that the AUMF activated the
President’s war powers, and that those powers include the authority to
convene military commissions in appropriate circumstances, there is nothing
in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress
intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of the
UCMJ." 31 The Court also noted that "‘[r]epeals by implication are not
favored.’" 32 And it explained that even where Congress has not only enacted
a force authorization but also declared war, such steps in and of themselves
do not authorize the President to do what pre-existing statutes forbid. 33
These conclusions apply equally to the question whether the AUMF
authorized warrantless wiretapping in violation of FISA. There is "nothing
in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress
intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth [in FISA]." 34 And
nothing in the legislative history of the AUMF suggests any intent by
Congress to override FISA or to impliedly repeal any of its provisions.
Finally, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has admitted that the
administration did not seek to amend FISA to authorize the NSA spying
program because various members of Congress advised the administration
that it would be "difficult, if not impossible to do so." 35 The administration
cannot argue on the one hand that Congress authorized the NSA program in
the AUMF, and at the same time, that it did not ask Congress for such
authorization because it would be difficult, if not impossible to get it. 36
31

126 S. Ct. at 2775 (citations omitted).
Id.
33
Id. at 2775 n.24 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1942)).
34
126 S. Ct. at 2775.
35
See Press Briefing from Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen., and General Michael Hayden,
Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html ("We have had discussions with
Congress in the past—certain members of Congress—as to whether or not FISA could be amended to
allow us to adequately deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised that that would be difficult, if not
impossible.").
36
The administration had a convenient vehicle for seeking any such amendment in the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The Patriot Act amended FISA in
several respects, including in sections 218 (allowing FISA wiretaps in criminal investigations) and 215
(popularly known as the "libraries provision"). Yet the administration did not ask Congress to amend
FISA to authorize the warrantless electronic surveillance at issue here.
32

9
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II. The Commander-In-Chief Argument
When pressed on its statutory argument, which Republican Senator
Arlen Specter dismissed as defying "logic and plain English," the
administration inevitably retreats to its constitutional contention, arguing that
as long as its reading of the AUMF is "fairly possible," 37 it should be
adopted to avoid a possible "conflict between FISA and the president’s
Article II authority as Commander-in-Chief." 38 The administration contends
that the president has exclusive constitutional authority over "the means and
methods of engaging the enemy," and that therefore if FISA prohibits
warrantless "electronic surveillance" deemed necessary by the president,
FISA is unconstitutional. 39 As will be noted in Point III below, the
"constitutional avoidance" doctrine does not support the administration
because accepting its interpretation of the AUMF would raise serious
constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment. In addition, there is
not a serious constitutional question that Congress can regulate wiretapping
of Americans even during wartime.
The argument that conduct undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief
that has some relevance to "engaging the enemy" is immune from
congressional regulation is directly contradicted by both case law and
historical precedent. Every time the Supreme Court has confronted a statute
limiting the Commander-in-Chief’s authority, it has upheld the statute. 40 No
precedent holds that the president, when acting as Commander-in-Chief, is
free to disregard an act of Congress, much less a criminal statute enacted by
Congress that was designed specifically to restrain the president as such.
There is no doubt that presidents have routinely collected signals
intelligence on the enemy during wartime. 41 But that historical fact proves
little, because for all or most of that history, Congress did not regulate
foreign intelligence gathering in any way. As Justice Jackson made clear in
his influential opinion in Youngstown, to say that a president may undertake
certain conduct in the absence of contrary congressional action does not
mean that he may undertake that action where Congress has addressed the

37

Executive and NSA Wartime Authority Hearing, supra note 3.
Moschella Letter, supra note 3.
39
DOJ Memo, supra note 2, at 6–10, 28–36.
40
See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 133–34 (Chase, C.J., concurring) (affirming limitations
set upon executive authority under the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 696, which
prevented suspension of the writ where statutory requirements are not met).
41
See John C. Reitz, E-Government, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 733, 749–50 (2006) (surveying the
history and scope of presidential authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of foreign
enemies dating back to Franklin D. Roosevelt).
38
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11
issue and disapproved of executive action. 42 Here, Congress has not only
disapproved of the action the president has taken but has done so in the most
emphatic way possible, by making it a crime.
The Supreme Court has addressed the propriety of executive action
contrary to congressional statute during wartime on only a handful of
occasions, and each time it has required the president to adhere to legislative
limits on his authority. In Youngstown, the Supreme Court invalidated
President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War where
Congress had "rejected an amendment which would have authorized such
governmental seizures in cases of emergency." 43
In Little v. Barreme, 44 the Court held unlawful a seizure pursuant to
presidential order of a ship during the "Quasi War" with France. 45 The Court
found that Congress had authorized the seizure only of ships going to France,
and therefore the president could not unilaterally order the seizure of a ship
coming from France. 46 Just as in Youngstown, the Court invalidated
executive action taken during wartime, said to be necessary to the war effort,
but implicitly disapproved by Congress. 47
President Bush’s unilateral executive action with respect to the NSA
is more sharply in conflict with congressional legislation than the
presidential actions deemed invalid in Youngstown and Barreme. In those
cases, Congress had merely failed to give the President the authority in
question, and thus the statutory limitation was implicit. Here, Congress went
further and expressly prohibited the President from taking the action he has
taken.
In 2004, President Bush asserted similar unilateral Commander-inChief authority in Rasul v. Bush, 48 and not a single Justice accepted the
contention. 49 In that case, the Bush administration maintained that it would
be unconstitutional to interpret the habeas corpus statute to afford judicial
review to enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay because it "would
directly interfere with the Executive’s conduct of the military campaign
against al Qaeda and its supporters" and would therefore raise "grave

42
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
43
Id. at 586; see also id. at 597–609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 656–60 (Burton, J.,
concurring); id. at 662–66 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment).
44
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
45
Id. at 179.
46
Id. at 177–78.
47
Id. at 178
48
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
49
Id. at 480; id. at 488 (Kennedy J., concurring); id. at 506 (Scalia dissenting).
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constitutional problems." 50 Refusing to accept this argument, the Court held
that Congress had conferred habeas jurisdiction on the federal courts to
entertain the detainees’ habeas actions. 51 Even Justice Scalia, writing for the
dissenters, agreed that Congress could have extended habeas jurisdiction to
the Guantanamo detainees, but differed as to whether Congress had in fact
done so. 52 Thus, not a single Justice accepted the Bush administration’s
contention that the president’s role as Commander-in-Chief may not be
limited by congressional and judicial oversight. 53
In Hamdi, the Court similarly rejected the president’s argument that
courts may not inquire into the factual basis for the detention of a U.S.
citizen as an enemy combatant. 54 Refuting the administration’s vision of
unilateral executive power, Justice O’Connor wrote for the plurality,
"[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive
in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of
conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake." 55
The Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld went out of its way to address
whether the president has Article II authority to contravene statutes that
restrict his ability to engage and defeat the enemy in times of war. 56 The
Court explained that even assuming the president has "independent power,
absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions,"
nevertheless "he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper
exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers." 57
In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy invoked Justice Jackson’s threetiered categorization of presidential power in Youngstown, and explained that
50

Brief for Respondents at 42, 44, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480–81.
Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53
Similarly, in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the Court unanimously found that
the Executive violated the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 696, by failing to discharge from
military custody a petitioner held by presidential order and charged with, inter alia, affording aid and
comfort to rebels, inciting insurrection, and violating the laws of war. Id. at 115–17, 131 (majority
opinion); id. at 133–36 (Chase, C.J., concurring); id .at 133 (noting that "[t]he constitutionality of this act
has not been questioned and is not doubted," even though the act "limited this authority [of the President
to suspend habeas] in important respects").
54
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
55
Id.
56
The Solicitor General had invoked the President’s Article II powers as a basis for a narrow
construction of the UCMJ, arguing that "‘the detention and trial of petitioners—ordered by the President
in the declared exercise of the President’s powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and
of grave public danger—are not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in
conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress.’" Brief for Respondents at 23, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
No. 05-184 (U.S., filed Feb. 23, 2006) (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25).
57
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23 (citing the "lowest ebb" passage of Justice Jackson’s
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
51
52
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the president was acting at the lowest ebb of presidential power, because he
had acted "in a field with a history of congressional participation and
regulation," and in contravention of "an intricate system of military justice"
regulated by the UCMJ. 58
The Bush administration has sought to distinguish Hamdan,
questioning whether Congress had the constitutional authority to enact FISA.
It contends that whereas the UCMJ was enacted pursuant to Congress’s
express Article I authorities, "[t]here is no similarly clear expression in the
Constitution of congressional power to regulate the President’s authority to
collect foreign intelligence necessary to protect the Nation." 59 But FISA has
been in place for almost thirty years, during which time Republican and
Democratic administrations alike have operated under its modest limitations
and conditions, with no suggestion that FISA is not appropriate Article I
legislation.
FISA was enacted pursuant to at least three Article I powers. Like
the statutes that restricted the President’s war powers in the leading cases of
Little v. Barreme, 60 and Youngstown, and like countless other current federal
statutes involving wire and electronic communications systems, FISA is
valid Commerce Clause legislation, because it regulates and protects wire
communications transmitted between states and between nations. 61 FISA is
also properly viewed as a statute "necessary and proper for carrying into
execution . . . powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in . . . any officer thereof." 62 Just as the Necessary and
Proper Clause empowered Congress to create the NSA in the first instance, 63
it authorizes Congress to set the terms under which that agency shall operate.
Finally, as the NSA is part of the Department of Defense, FISA’s application
to that agency is also an exercise Congress’s power "[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." 64

58

Id., 126 S. Ct. at 2800-2801 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer,

JJ.).
59
See Letter to Senator Charles Schumer from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ July 10th Letter") at 2, available at
http://lawculture.blogs.com/lawculture/files/NSA.Hamdan.response.schumer.pdf (last visited November
20, 2006).
60
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804).
61
See 50 U.S.C. § 1501(l) (defining "wire communication" to mean "any communication while it
is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as
a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications").
62
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
63
cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
64
Art. I., § 8, cl. 14.
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The administration argues that the President’s authority to collect
foreign intelligence is "a direct corollary of his authority, recognized in
Hamdan, to direct military campaigns." 65 But Hamdan likewise concerned
an Executive war powers function— the trial of enemy combatants for
violations of the laws of war—that "‘by universal agreement and practice’" is
an "‘important incident of war.’" 66 The Court in Hamdan nonetheless found
no constitutional concern with construing a congressional statute to limit the
president in his trial of enemy combatants. So, too, there is no constitutional
impediment to Congress restricting the President’s ability to conduct
electronic surveillance within the United States and targeted at United States
persons.
In short, not a single Justice in Hamdan offered the slightest
indication that the UCMJ, as construed by the Court, would violate Article
II—even though the statutory restrictions in Hamdan dealt solely with the
President’s treatment of alleged unlawful enemy combatants, and (unlike
FISA) not with the conduct of non-enemy U.S. persons inside the United
States.
Detaining and trying enemy combatants captured on the battlefield is
surely far closer to the core of "engaging the enemy" than is warrantless
wiretapping of U.S. persons within the United States. Yet the Supreme
Court in Rasul, Hamdi, and Hamdan squarely held that Congress and the
courts both had a proper role to play in reviewing and restricting the
president’s detention power. These cases refute the administration’s
contention, resurrected in the context of the NSA spying debate, that
Congress may not enact statutes that regulate and limit the President’s
options as Commander-in-Chief.
The Constitution’s text and history confirm this conclusion. The
framers of the Constitution made the president the "Commander in Chief,"
but otherwise assigned substantial power to Congress in connection with
war-making. Article I gives Congress the power to declare war and to
authorize more limited forms of military enterprises (through "letters of
marque and reprisal"); to raise and support the army and navy; to prescribe
"rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces;" to
define offenses against the law of nations; and to spend federal dollars. 67 In
addition, Congress has the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
65
66

DOJ July 10th Letter at 2.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at

28).
67

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10–14.
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Officer thereof." 68 The president, meanwhile, is constitutionally obligated to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," 69 —including FISA. These
provisions make clear that while the framers recognized the desirability of
giving the president the authority to direct the troops, they also recognized
the real dangers of presidential wartime authority and sought to limit that
authority by vesting in Congress broad authority to create, fund, and regulate
the very forces that the president commands in engaging the enemy. These
textual provisions cannot be read to afford the president uncheckable
authority to choose the "means and methods of engaging the enemy."
History confirms this conclusion. Congress has routinely enacted
statutes regulating the Commander-in-Chief’s "means and methods of
engaging the enemy." 70 It has subjected the Armed Forces to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, which expressly restricts the means they use in
"engaging the enemy." 71 It has enacted statutes setting forth the rules for
governing occupied territory, and these statutes displace presidential
regulations that have governed such territory in the absence of legislation. 72
And most recently, it has enacted statutes prohibiting torture 73 and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment. 74
If the Bush administration were correct that Congress cannot
interfere with the Commander-in-Chief’s discretion in "engaging the
enemy," all of these statutes would be unconstitutional. Yet President Bush
has conceded, contrary to the position initially taken by the Justice
Department’s August 2002 torture memorandum, that he may not order
torture as Commander-in-Chief. 75 Torturing a suspect, no less than
wiretapping an American, might provide information about the enemy, yet
President Bush has conceded that Congress can prohibit that conduct. Surely
Congress has as much authority to regulate wiretapping of Americans as it
has to regulate torture of foreign detainees.
68

Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Id. at art. II, § 3.
70
See Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265–66 (1909) (stating that the authority of military
government during the period between the cession and the action of Congress is of large extent but not
unlimited).
71
The National Security Agency’s Domestic Spying Program: February 2, 2006 Letter from
Scholars and Former Government Officials to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice
Department Whitepaper of January 19, 2006, 81 IND. L.J. 1415, 1420 (2006).
72
Id.
73
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2000).
74
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §1003, 119 Stat. 2739–2740 (2005)..
75
See Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, Bush and His Senior Aides Press On in Legal Defense for
Wiretapping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at A13 (describing a CBS News interview in which
President Bush said, "I don't think a president can order torture, for example . . . . There are clear red
lines").
69
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The Justice Department has argued in the alternative that even if
Congress may regulate "signals intelligence" during wartime to some degree,
construing FISA to preclude warrantless wiretapping of Americans in the
context of the NSA spying program would impermissibly intrude on the
president’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief role. 76
In assessing this argument, it is important to first note what FISA
does and does not regulate. Administration defenders have repeatedly
argued that if the president is wiretapping an al Qaeda member in
Afghanistan, it should not have to turn off the wiretap simply because he
happens to call someone within the United States. The simple answer is that
nothing in FISA would compel that result. FISA does not regulate electronic
surveillance acquired abroad and targeted at non-U.S. persons, even if the
surveillance happens to collect information on a communication with a U.S.
person. FISA’s requirements are triggered only when the surveillance is
"targeting [a] United States person who is in the United States," or the
surveillance "acquisition occurs in the United States." 77
Thus, the
hypothetical tap on the al Qaeda member abroad is not governed by FISA at
all.
Second, even when the target of surveillance is a U.S. person within
the United States or the information is physically acquired here, FISA does
not require that the wiretap be turned off. FISA merely requires that it be
approved by a judge, based on a showing of probable cause that the target is
an "agent of a foreign power," which includes a member of a terrorist
organization, or even, in some circumstances, an unaffiliated "lone wolf"
terrorist. 78 Such judicial approval may be obtained after the wiretap is put in
place, so long as it is approved within seventy-two hours. 79 Accordingly, the
notion that FISA bars wiretapping of suspected al Qaeda members is a myth.
Because FISA leaves unregulated electronic surveillance conducted
outside the United States and not targeted at U.S. persons, it leaves to the
president’s unfettered discretion a wide swath of "signals intelligence."
Moreover, it does not actually prohibit any signals intelligence regarding al
Qaeda, but merely requires judicial approval where the surveillance targets a
U.S. person or is acquired here. As such, the statute cannot reasonably be
said to intrude impermissibly upon the president’s ability to "engage the
enemy," and certainly does not come anywhere close to "prohibit[ing] the
President from undertaking actions necessary to fulfill his constitutional
76

DOJ Memo, supra note 2, at 29, 34–35.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1)–(2) (2000).
78
See id. at §§ 1801(a)–(b), 1805(a)–(b) (suggesting that if the target is a non-U.S. person, it is
sufficient to show that he is a "lone wolf" terrorist).
79
Id. § 1805(f).
77
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obligation to protect the Nation from foreign attack," as the Justice
Department claims. 80 Again, if, as President Bush concedes, Congress can
absolutely prohibit certain methods of "engaging the enemy," such as torture,
surely it can impose reasonable regulations on electronic surveillance of U.S.
persons.
In support of its constitutional argument, the Justice Department has
invoked the decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in In re
Sealed Case No. 02-001, 81 and decisions of several courts that have
recognized in dicta the president’s inherent authority to engage in
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. The court in In re Sealed
Case did suggest that Congress cannot "encroach on the President’s
constitutional power" to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance. 82 But this
statement is no more than a truism; to paraphrase another president,
everything depends on the meaning of the word "encroach." The court in In
re Sealed Case plainly did not mean that any regulation of foreign
intelligence gathering amounts to impermissible encroachment because it
upheld FISA. Indeed, the court did not even attempt to define what sorts of
regulations would constitute impermissible "encroachment." Thus, this
statement does not support the conclusion that the president’s authority to
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance must be wholly unfettered, but only
the much more limited proposition that at some point, regulation may rise to
the level of impermissible encroachment.
Significantly, the only decision cited in In re Sealed Case for the
proposition that the president has inherent authority to engage in foreign
intelligence surveillance addressed the president’s power before FISA was
enacted. 83 That decision, which reviewed the constitutionality of pre-FISA
surveillance after FISA was enacted, also acknowledged that FISA itself was
constitutional, and therefore also does not support the contention that the
president’s "inherent" power is immune from congressional regulation. 84
In fact, apart from the dictum in In re Sealed Case, all the cases that
have recognized inherent presidential authority to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance have addressed the president’s pre-FISA authority.
But the president’s authority before FISA was enacted was radically different
from his authority thereafter. Before FISA was enacted, Congress expressly
80

DOJ Memo, supra note 2, at 35.
See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam)
(finding that FISA, as amended, was constitutional because the surveillance it authorizes is reasonable).
82
Id. at 742.
83
See id. (citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 n.4 (4th Cir. 1980)).
84
See id. at 746 ("We, therefore, believe firmly, applying the balancing test drawn from Keith,
that FISA as amended is constitutional because the surveillances it authorizes are reasonable.").
81
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recognized the president’s "constitutional power . . . to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States." 85 When Congress enacted FISA in the wake of demonstrated abuses
of that power, however, it repealed that provision and, as shown above, made
it a crime to conduct wiretapping without congressional authority. Before
FISA, the president was therefore acting in Justice Jackson’s Youngstown
"category one," 86 namely, where the president acts with the express or
implied approval of Congress. In that setting, the president’s powers are at
their zenith. In authorizing the NSA to conduct warrantless wiretapping in
contravention of FISA, by contrast, the president is acting in Justice
Jackson’s "category three," 87 where the president acts in contravention of the
express or implied will of Congress. There, the president’s power is at its
"lowest ebb." 88 Thus, the fact that the president had the power to act when
Congress had approved of his actions does not mean that the president can
choose to violate criminal prohibitions once Congress has regulated the
subject.
Some statutes might well impermissibly interfere with the
president’s role as Commander-in-Chief. If Congress sought to place
authority to direct battlefield operations in an officer not subject to the
president’s supervision, for example, such a statute would likely violate the
president’s role as Commander-in-Chief. Similarly, Congress should not be
constitutionally permitted to micromanage tactical decisions in particular
battles. But short of such highly unlikely hypotheticals, Congress has broad
leeway to govern and regulate the armed services and certainly to protect the
privacy expectations of Americans using telephone and email
communications.
III. The Fourth Amendment Argument
The NSA spying program also raises serious constitutional questions
under the Fourth Amendment. While the specific contours of the program
remain undisclosed, we know that it involves warrantless wiretapping of
United States persons within the United States, in which one of the persons
on the call is thought to be associated with al Qaeda or unspecified "affiliated
organizations." Fourth Amendment analysis must begin with the recognition
that the Supreme Court has never upheld warrantless wiretapping within the
United States, for any purpose. The Court has squarely held that individuals
85
86
87
88

18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976) repealed by Pub.L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1797 (1978).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
Id. at 637.
Id.
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have a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone calls, and that probable
cause and a warrant are necessary to authorize electronic surveillance of such
communications. 89 And it has specifically rejected the argument that
domestic security concerns justify warrantless wiretapping. 90
The Court in United States v. United States Dist. Court 91 left open
whether warrantless wiretapping for foreign intelligence purposes would be
permissible. 92 The Justice Department contends that the NSA program can
be justified under a line of Fourth Amendment cases permitting searches
without warrants and probable cause to further "special needs" above and
beyond ordinary law enforcement. 93 But while it is difficult to apply the
Fourth Amendment without knowing all the details of the program, the
"special needs" doctrine, which has sustained automobile drunk driving
checkpoints and standardized drug testing in schools, does not appear to
support warrantless wiretapping of this kind.
The need to gather intelligence on the enemy surely qualifies as a
"special need," but that is only the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry.
The Court then looks to a variety of factors to assess whether the search is
reasonable, including the extent of the intrusion; whether the program is
standardized or allows for discretionary targeting; and whether there is a
demonstrated need to dispense with the warrant and probable cause
requirements. The Court has upheld highway drunk driving checkpoints, for
example, because they are standardized, the stops are brief and minimally
intrusive, and a warrant and probable cause requirement would be
unadministrable and would therefore defeat the purpose of keeping drunk
drivers off the road. 94 Similarly, the Court has upheld school drug testing
programs because students have diminished expectations of privacy in
school, the testing was limited to students engaging in extracurricular
programs (so that students had advance notice and the choice to opt out), the
drug testing was standardized, and the intrusion was minimal because the
tests only revealed the presence of drugs. 95
89
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that government’s activities in
electronically listening to and recording defendant’s words violated the privacy upon which defendant
justifiably relied, and thus constituted a search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment).
90
See United States v. U. S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (finding that electronic surveillance
in domestic security matters requires an appropriate prior warrant procedure).
91
Id.
92
Id. at 321.
93
DOJ Memo, supra note 2, at 36–41.
94
See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (establishing that highway
sobriety checkpoint programs are consistent with the Fourth Amendment).
95
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (authorizing a school drug testing
policy of students as constitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because the State may
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The NSA spying program has none of the safeguards found critical
to upholding "special needs" searches in other contexts. It consists not of a
minimally intrusive brief stop on a highway or a urine test limited to
detecting drugs, but of the wiretapping of private telephone and email
communications, which could reveal all sorts of personal and intimate details
of the target’s private life. It is not standardized, but subject to discretionary
targeting under a standard and process that remain secret. Those whose
privacy is intruded upon have no notice or choice to opt out of the
surveillance. And it is neither limited to the environment of a school nor
analogous to a brief stop for a few seconds at a highway checkpoint. Finally,
and most importantly, the fact that FISA has been used successfully for
almost thirty years demonstrates that a warrant and probable cause regime is
not impracticable for foreign intelligence surveillance.
Accordingly, to extend the "special needs" doctrine to the NSA
program, which authorizes unlimited warrantless wiretapping of the most
private of conversations without statutory authority, judicial review, or
probable cause, would render that doctrine unrecognizable.
IV. Security Concerns
Given the broad consensus that we should be listening into al
Qaeda’s phone calls when they call into the United States, the real issue in
the NSA spying debate is whether the president can violate criminal law in
secret. Contrary to the administration’s claims, security concerns do not
justify defying FISA’s criminal prohibition or bypassing the judicial
approval that FISA demands. Attorney General Gonzales has claimed that
the NSA program employs the same substantive standard required by
FISA—"probable cause." 96 If so, warrants should be readily granted by the
FISA courts, which have rarely rejected a wiretapping application. The
attorney general contends that the program would suffer if NSA officials had
to seek approval from the FISA court for its wiretaps because it takes time to
prepare an application. 97 The fact that a wiretap may be put in place
immediately before the FISA court approves it, so long as a request is
submitted to the court within seventy-two hours, is insufficient, according to
the attorney general, because it takes time for executive officials to make the
initial determination that the court would in fact grant the request. 98 But if

exercise a degree of supervision over its students who are in the temporary custody of the State as
schoolteacher).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Executive and NSA Wartime Authority Hearing, supra note 3.
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the NSA is using the same probable cause standard as is set forth in FISA,
then some executive official has to make the initial "probable cause"
determination whether or not court approval is subsequently sought. The
mere fact that one’s probable cause determination will be subject to review
by another should not alter the initial determination, unless in practice the
NSA is applying a lower standard of suspicion. But to date, the attorney
general has insisted that the NSA is using the same probable cause standard
set forth in FISA. If that is the case, there is no excuse for failing to seek
judicial confirmation of the executive’s probable cause judgments.
The administration also argues that obtaining statutory authorization
for the NSA spying program would require disclosure of its operational
details and would thereby compromise its effectiveness. This argument, too,
is difficult to accept. Surely al Qaeda members assume that we are listening
to their calls. If they consulted a lawyer, they would know, for example, that
there are no statutory limits on the president obtaining electronic surveillance
of their communications abroad, even if they are calling into the United
States. Thus, they would have to assume that all their calls are being
monitored, regardless of any disclosure of the details of the NSA spying
program.
Moreover, even if an al Qaeda member could be confident that a
particular call was governed by the legal limits set forth in FISA, he would
still have to assume that his communications would be intercepted. FISA
permits such interception on a showing of probable cause that an individual
is an "agent of a foreign power," which includes a member of al Qaeda or
other international terrorist organization. Because an al Qaeda member
cannot know how much information the government has about him, he
would have to assume that his calls could be monitored. Thus, revelation of
the NSA program cannot conceivably "tip off" al Qaeda members any more
than the current state of the law does.
When pressed on this issue before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Attorney General Gonzales suggested that the concern is not so much the
existence of legal authority to wiretap, but the widespread news coverage
that the program has received. 99 He suggested that even if al Qaeda
members might know in theory that they could be subject to surveillance,
front page news on the subject will bring that lesson home much more
concretely. 100 But if that is the concern, the administration is as much to
blame for tipping off al Qaeda as anyone. Had it simply included in the
omnibus Patriot Act another provision authorizing this program, the NSA
99
100

Id.
Id.
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spying program might have generated some debate, but it would have been
just one among many provisions debated in the enactment of the Patriot Act.
If the program is as narrow as administration officials portray it, its approval
would not likely have been controversial, and like many provisions in the
342-page Patriot Act, it might have generated no press attention. In any
event, once enacted, news attention would almost certainly have died down
substantially.
By forgoing the legal route of amending FISA, however, the
president virtually guaranteed that the program would ultimately generate
widespread attention. The program was presumably leaked to the New York
Times precisely because of concerns within the administration about its
legality. The reason the program has generated so much attention since its
disclosure is not because of any broad concern about the surveillance of
suspected al Qaeda members, but because of concern about the assertions of
executive power that the administration has advanced to defend the program.
Thus, had the administration sought and obtained congressional approval of
the wiretapping provisions in the Patriot Act, this issue would likely have
generated far less attention than it now has.
In other words, the controversy surrounding the NSA spying
program has been sparked not by the substance of the NSA spying program
—we still don’t know what that substance really is—but by the way the
administration went about putting the program in place, and especially by the
implications of the administration’s arguments for the system of checks and
balances so central to our constitutional democracy. If the administration
could have put the same surveillance program in place with congressional
approval, it would have been able to gather the same intelligence, while
avoiding the national controversy its actions have sparked.
These features of the NSA spying program—unnecessary
overreaching by the administration sparking a negative reaction that could
have been avoided had the power been asserted in a less arrogant manner—
are unfortunately common to many of the Bush administration’s post-9/11
counterterrorism initiatives. On issue after issue, the administration has
overplayed its hand and then been forced to pay the consequences. These
consequences have ultimately undermined our national security in ways that
are likely to plague us for the foreseeable future.
The administration’s treatment of those detained at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, illustrates the point. Few would dispute that in a military
conflict, a nation is entitled to capture and detain those fighting for the
enemy for the duration of the conflict. The world did not object to our using
military force to respond to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and would not
have objected to our detaining those fighting for al Qaeda, had we pursued
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that authority in a measured way. Under the Geneva Conventions, a detainee
is entitled to an informal hearing to determine his status where there is any
room for doubt and is entitled to be treated humanely. 101 Yet rather than
honor these minimal restrictions, the Bush administration proclaimed the
Geneva Conventions had no applicability, refused to provide any hearings
until it lost in the Supreme Court, and subjected the detainees to coercive
interrogation tactics that without a doubt amount to inhumane treatment and
in some instances rise to the level of torture. These tactics, entirely
unnecessary to achieve the primary goal of incapacitating enemy forces
during the military conflict with al Qaeda, turned Guantanamo into a black
mark on the United States’ reputation.
The same is true of the administration’s approach to torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. The United States has signed and
ratified a treaty absolutely prohibiting such conduct under all circumstances,
including wartime. But the administration early on apparently decided that
rather than adhere to that universally accepted prohibition, it would work to
create as many loopholes and exceptions as possible, to free up officials to
employ harshly coercive interrogation tactics.
Thus, in the Justice
Department’s 2002 torture memorandum, it construed torture exceedingly
narrowly in order to permit threats of death, the administration of drugs,
infliction of mental pain, and infliction of physical pain short of that
associated with organ failure or death. 102 The Justice Department also
concocted a novel interpretation of the treaty prohibition on cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment to exempt foreign nationals held abroad of its
protections. These efforts led to the graphically documented abuse of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and to the undocumented but
widely acknowledged abuse of others who had "disappeared" into secret CIA
prisons known only as "black sites." And those practices, once disclosed,
fueled anti-American sentiment around the world and handed al Qaeda and
other terrorists the best propaganda it could hope for.
The NSA spying revelations are not likely to generate the same level
of international opprobrium as Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, because the
protection of privacy is not as firmly established as the safeguards against
torture and arbitrary detention. These spying regulations, however, have
already caused substantial controversy within the United States. The country
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is sharply divided on whether the program was legal. 103 This internal
division is itself costly. It should not be difficult to unite the nation in the
fight against al Qaeda, and a united nation is stronger than a divided one.
Assertions of uncheckable presidential power to violate criminal statutes in
secret do not help to unite the country behind its leader.
In each of the areas described above—detention, torture, cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment, and now NSA spying—the administration
has asserted a presidential prerogative to choose "the means and methods of
engaging the enemy" without regulation, restriction, or oversight by the other
branches. As a technical matter, the administration does not claim that the
president is above the law. But there is a very thin line between a claim that
one is above the law, and an assertion that one has exclusive power "to say
what the law is" with respect to "engaging the enemy." 104 That view is
contrary to constitutional text and history; wholly unnecessary to preserve
our security; and almost certain to make Americans less safe as we proceed
in the struggle to protect ourselves from terrorist attacks.
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